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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) on 
Carbon Dioxide emissions. Carbon Dioxide is the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas. 
A global problem that requires a multilateral solution. To take this into account we 
introduce an institutional variable, which captures the degree of international 
commitment to decrease and control the degradation of the environment. We test three 
hypotheses and find: (i) Asymmetry: the development level of the target country 
determines the direction of the effect of M&As on CO2 emissions; (ii) Sector-specific 
impact: pollution intensive sectors have an impact on CO2 emissions, whereas other 
sectors do not; (iii) Multilateralism: multilateral agreements are important to reduce 
CO2 emissions. 
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1 Introduction 
The increase in pollution emission challenges researchers to assess its causes, which 
frequently have an economic origin. Trade, growth, foreign direct investment, among 
other economic factors, affect the environment. Economists analyzed each of these 
different factors individually. Less attention (if any) is given to Cross-Border Mergers 
and Acquisitions (henceforth M&As). There are at least two reasons to consider these 
flows separately. First, it constitutes the biggest share of total FDI (Brakman et al., 
2008) and is the main driving force of the recent increase in foreign direct investment 
(Unctad, 2006). Second, the effect of M&As and Greenfield Investments on the 
environment is not necessarily the same. Greenfield investments involve the 
construction of new production facilities, making the implementation of more up-to-
date (and perhaps cleaner) technologies easier. M&As, on the other hand, may involve 
the extensive use of current technology and production facilities. But it can also imply 
the adoption of cleaner techniques from the acquiring firm. 
 
To uncover the effect that M&As can have on pollution emissions, we need to consider 
a possible asymmetry with respect to the development level of both target and acquirer 
countries. Developed countries are associated with higher environmental standards, 
which influences the technology adopted by firms. Also, a disaggregation of the data 
regarding the target sector is necessary. Sectors that pollute more are expected to have a 
more substantial impact on the environment than sectors that do not pollute. Analyzing 
all sectors together may jeopardize the significance of the results. 
 
Carbon Dioxide is the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas. The biggest concern with 
the increase of CO2 emissions is global warming. Because of its global effect the 
solution rests upon the collaboration among countries. Therefore, in the past years many 
countries committed themselves to multilateral agreements to decrease and control the 
degradation of the environment. The participation in these agreements is another factor 
that determines CO2 emissions, and should be controlled for to examine the impact of 
M&As on the environment. 
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The trade-off between environmental preservation and economic growth is non-
deniable. But, even this common-sense relation can be the origin of long debates. If we 
consider only emissions of Carbon Dioxide we find that economic growth has a 
different impact on the amount of emissions, depending on the development level of the 
countries. By separating the countries in High income and Low or Middle income 
(World Bank historical classification), Figure 1 shows that for different group of years, 
there is (if any) a negative relation between CO2 emissions given the GDP for high 
income countries, but a positive relation for low and medium income countries.  
 
Figure 1 – Impact of Economic Growth on Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
  
  
Source: Data for Carbon Dioxide emission and GDP (constant 2000 dollars) are from the World Bank, 
WDI. 
 
There are at least two distinct explanations for the negative relation between CO2 
emissions and GDP for high income countries. First, the use of cleaner technologies by 
more developed countries. Second, developed countries are relocating dirty industries 
towards developing countries (either through trade or FDI).  
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Among the current research, a main topic is whether a closed economy (both in terms of 
trade and FDI) is preferred from an environmental point of view. Our objective in this 
paper is to focus on the impact of M&As on Carbon Dioxide emissions. If it affects the 
environment, then which direction prevails: do acquirer firms bring cleaner technology 
to their target firms, or do they take advantage of weaker pollution policy in the target 
country to use (perhaps) cheaper and dirtier technology? 
 
Most of the related papers (discussed in section 2) have explored the interconnection 
between FDI and the environment, but no consensus has so far been reached. We take 
this literature in consideration, as well as the literature on the impact of trade on the 
environment. Our main contribution is threefold. First, we make a sectoral 
disaggregation of the M&As, second, we separate both target and acquirer countries 
with respect to their income classification (World Bank
1
), and finally we consider the 
impact of a multilateral institutional variable. 
 
We test three hypotheses. In regard the income classification of the countries, we 
explore a possible asymmetric relationship. Considering that, in general, developed 
countries face stricter environmental policy; it is expected that multinationals from 
developed countries adopt cleaner technologies than the ones from developing 
countries. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Asymmetry 
M&As from a high income country (acquiring country) reduce CO2 emissions. 
 
For the disaggregation of the data in sectors, we analyze whether all sectors have an 
impact on CO2 emissions, or only a few of them. We separate the data on M&As in four 
sectors (see section 2 and appendix A for details) to test our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Sector-specific impact 
M&As in non-polluting sectors
2
 do not affect CO2 emissions. 
                                                 
1
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls 
2
 Non-polluting sectors will be: Agriculture and Mining; Construction and Services and zero pollution 
intensive manufacturing sectors. 
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Finally, since CO2 emission is a global problem (in the sense that the emission of every 
country will have an impact on the world as a whole) multilateral agreement is the most 
effective way to persuade countries to decrease their emission level. Therefore, we 
propose an institutional index, which varies from 0 to 10, where 0 means that a country 
does not participate
3
 in any of the major multilateral agreements, and 10 if it participates 
in all of them (see section 2 and appendix B for details). This gives rise to our final 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Multilateralism 
Multilateral agreements are an important instrument to decrease CO2 emissions. 
 
To test these three hypotheses, we consider a panel of more than 100 target countries, in 
the period 1988-2004. Our model specification considers both the theoretical and 
empirical literature in the field. Therefore, the next section of this paper gives an 
overview of the literature, and the motivation of our hypotheses. In Section 3 we present 
the empirical model specification. Section 4 describes the data base and presents some 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 covers the estimation results and robustness checks, and 
finally Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical framework and motivation 
2a Motivation and contribution 
Recent theory on M&As (Neary, 2007) shows that acquirers are the most efficient firms 
among its competitors. This result has further been supported by the empirical literature 
(Brakman et al., 2008). Additionally, they pursue more innovation activities as 
compared to uni-national firms (Dunning, 1996; Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Gerybadze 
and Reger, 1999; Johansson and Loof, 2006). This suggests that multinationals have a 
capacity to improve, which makes them more likely to undergo innovative ways to 
reduce costs (by reducing waste, for example), and to create higher quality and cleaner 
products and process.  
 
                                                 
3
 Participation means that the country has signed and ratified the agreement. 
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Porter and van der Linde (1995) show that innovation can lead to a decrease in pollution 
and a simultaneous increase in competitiveness, which they name as a win-win 
situation. The authors describe case examples of different ways through which 
companies can increase competitiveness by becoming more environment-friendly. This 
can be achieved because high emissions are frequently the result of inefficient use of the 
resources, which leads to extra handling, storage and disposal activities. By eliminating 
costly materials, reducing disposal costs for the user, making better use of materials in 
the process, and recycling, for example the firm will achieve the win-win situation. 
 
Nonetheless, as the argument from Porter and van der Linde (1995) goes, it is the 
environmental standards faced by the companies that will trigger innovation in cleaner 
product or processes. The authors refer to stricter environmental standards as 
“innovation offsets” because it stimulates innovation that reduces pollution emissions. 
Therefore, when firms are exposed to a stricter environmental regulation, they will have 
an incentive to search for ways to reduce their pollution emissions. The actual 
introduction of cleaner technologies will depend on their resource capacity. These two 
characteristics (strict environmental policy and financial resources) characterize firms 
active in M&As from developed countries. 
 
Two elements from the abovementioned literature motivate the hypothesis of 
asymmetry. First, since firms from developed countries face stricter environmental 
regulation we expect them to adopt cleaner technologies. Second, we expect active 
firms in M&As to be more prone to innovate in technologies to reduce pollution. These 
two facts together suggest our first hypothesis of an asymmetry between high income 
countries and low-middle income countries with respect to the impact of M&As on air 
pollution. To be more specific, we expect M&As from developed countries to decrease 
air pollution in the target country, holding everything else constant. Nonetheless, we do 
not expect this effect from M&As originating from developing countries. 
 
Moreover, the same literature also motivates the investigation of the impact of M&As in 
pollution, since active firms in M&As are more efficient firms, and therefore have more 
financial capacity to invest and innovate in new technologies. However, they need an 
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“innovation offset”, such as rising environmental costs, to stimulate them to invest in 
cleaner technologies. Off course, this is only relevant for firms which are pollution 
intensive. This motivates the sector disaggregation of our data. 
 
Table 1 – Sector disaggregation 
Sector Group Representative sectors  
A – Agriculture and Mining Agriculture; Forestry; Fishing and Mining 
C – Construction and Services Construction; Transportation; Communications; 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services, Wholesale 
Trade; Retail Trade; Finance; Insurance; Real 
Estate; Services; Public Administration 
P –Pollution Intensive Petroleum refining and related industries; Primary 
Metal Industries; Food and kindred products; 
Textile mill products; Furniture and fixtures; 
Stone, clay and concrete products; Fabricated 
metal products 
Z – Zero Pollution Intensive Apparel and other finished products made from 
fabrics and similar materials; Leather and leather 
products 
Note: a) Pollution intensity is defined as the ratio of kilograms of Carbon Monoxide Emission over the value of 
output, from the Industrial Pollution Projection System (Hettige et al., 1995). b) Representative sectors in groups P, 
and Z are based on 2 digit code classification. They are listed as representative because many of the 4 digit SIC code 
under them belong to one of these groups. For the exact disaggregation, see Appendix A. 
 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the sectoral distinction in M&As has not yet been 
analyzed empirically to measure the impact on air pollution. Nevertheless, such a study 
would contribute in disentangling which target sectors of M&As have an impact on the 
environment. We disaggregate manufacturing sectors in pollution intensive, and zero 
pollution intensive, along with agriculture and mining; and services and construction 
(Table 1 above presents a few representative sectors that fall under these categories, 
while Appendix A provides the complete disaggregation). 
 
The above disaggregation of the sectors allows us to analyze the possibility of spill-over 
effects. If we find a negative impact of M&As in sectors not intensive in pollution in 
CO2 emission, then we would have an indication for a spill-over effect, a fact present in 
the literature (see Albornoz et al., 2009 for a recent paper on this matter). That is, when 
an M&A occur in a target sector which is zero pollution intensive, this firm may 
demand their suppliers to provide a clean product or process. In this way, even firms 
that do not pollute would have a positive impact on the environment. 
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Table 2 – Major Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
Agreements Year  Main details 
1 – Aarhus Convention 1998 Convention on access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters. 
2 – Bio-Safety Protocol 2000 International treaty governing the movements of 
living modified organisms resulting from modern 
biotechnology from one country to another. 
3 – Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
1992 The objectives are the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components 
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. 
4 – Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
1966 Agreement on civil and political rights of 
individuals and nations. 
5 – Convention to Combat 
Desertification 
1994 Convention to combat desertification and 
mitigate the effects of drought in countries 
experiencing serious drought and/or 
desertification. 
6 – Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights 
1966 Agreement on economic, social, and cultural 
rights of individuals and nations. 
7 – Convention on 
International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
1975 Agreement to ensure that international trade in 
specimens of wild animals and plants does not 
threaten their survival. 
8 – Kyoto Protocol 1997 The major feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it 
sets binding targets for 37 industrialized 
countries and the European community for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
9 – Stockholm Convention 2001 Convention on persistent organic pollutants to 
protect human health and the environment from 
chemicals that remain intact in the environment 
for long periods. 
10 – United Nations 
Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCC) 
1992 The convention ultimate objective is to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. 
 
The motivation for the Multilateralism hypothesis is the global nature of the problem 
imposed by high CO2 emissions. To take that into account we propose an institutional 
index. It involves the number, out of 10 major multilateral agreements, that the target 
country has signed and ratified. To construct this index we counted the number of 
agreements that a particular country participated in each year, from 1988 until 2004 (see 
Appendix B for details). Table 2 gives an overall description of these agreements. The 
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agreements are considered as the 10 major environmental multilateral agreements by the 
Earth Trends, World Resources Institute. 
 
We expect that countries participating in a higher number of multilateral agreements to 
be more active in implementing measures that decrease environmental degradation. This 
is particularly important for CO2 emissions, since what matters is the total emission by 
all countries. 
 
2b Theoretical framework 
To the best of our knowledge there are no papers that try to assess the impact of M&As 
on the environment, but a few analyze it for Foreign Direct Investment as a whole
4
. 
Jorgenson (2007a) investigates the impact of FDI dependence (FDI over GDP) in the 
manufacturing sector on CO2 and organic water pollutants emissions in less developed 
countries. Using panel regression analyses covering the period 1975-2000, the author‟s 
finding indicates that FDI dependence in manufacturing has a positive impact in CO2 
(and water pollutants) emission in less developed countries. 
 
Bao et al. (2008) adopt a quadratic relation to measure the impact of FDI in pollution 
emission
5
 in China. Their argument is that initially, multinationals have a “scale” effect 
in the target country, which leads to a rise in pollution. As the number of multinationals 
increases in this target country, the demand for stricter environmental regulation goes 
up. This pushes multinationals to adopt cleaner technologies, with spill-overs to 
domestic firms as well. Based on data from 29 provinces in the period 1992-2004, the 
authors find support for an inverted-U curve relationship between FDI and pollution 
emission. Thus, initially, multinationals would have a negative impact on the 
environment, and after a threshold has been reached, the impact would be positive. 
 
                                                 
4
 Most of the papers that explore the link between the environment and FDI focus on the pollution-haven 
hypothesis, that is, they measure the impact of environmental regulation on the attraction of FDI 
(Eskeland and Harrison, 1997; Wheeler, 2001; Smarzynska and Wei, 2001). 
5
 The authors use five different indicators of pollution emission: industrial polluted water emissions; 
chemical oxygen demand in industrial water pollution; sulfur dioxide emissions; industrial smoke 
emissions and industrial solid wastes. 
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Liang (2006) also estimates the impact of FDI on pollution emission in China, but using 
as an indicator for the pollutant, sulfur dioxide. The author considers more than 260 
cities from 1996 to 2003 and estimates the model using an instrumental variable 
approach. The results generally show that more FDI decreases SO2 emissions. 
 
Jorgenson (2007) tests whether FDI as a proportion of total GDP in the primary sector 
increases CO2 emissions from agriculture production in less developed countries. The 
motivation is based on the hypothesis that foreign firms in the agriculture sector use 
more chemicals and machinery in order to increase productivity. His results, using data 
from 1980 and 1999, indicate that FDI dependence in agriculture increases CO2 
emissions in developing countries. 
 
Antweiler et al. (2001), while paying more attention to the impact of trade on the 
environment, have also considered the role of FDI. The authors use the ratio of inward 
stock of FDI to the overall capital stock and in addition interact this variable with a 
categorical variable of GDP per capita. In general they find that the link between FDI 
intensity and pollution level is positive but small. 
 
Furthermore, the papers that deal with the impact of trade on the environment also bring 
important insight to our research question. More importantly, we believe that the 
literature on FDI and trade should not be separated. If there is an indication that both 
factors can affect pollution emission, than they should be included together in any 
empirical model that tries to understand the determinants of pollution emission. For this 
reason, we will also control for trade variables in our empirical model specification. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the “pollution havens” models of international trade 
are the reference of supporters of the idea that poorer countries are harmed with trade 
because of their weaker environmental regulation. However, these models base on the 
assumption that environmental regulation is an essential production cost. Once factor 
endowment is also considered, the results may actually reverse. Poorer countries may 
specialize in cleaner goods if they have a relative abundance in factors used intensively 
in the production of clean goods. 
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Therefore, the impact of trade on the environment is not so obvious. Briefly stating, two 
mechanisms will determine the overall result: relative factor endowment abundance and 
environmental regulation. To measure the impact of trade on the environment, we need 
to take both mechanisms into account. What is more commonly done in the empirical 
literature is to measure the impact of trade openness on pollution. 
 
Harbaugh et al. (2000) consider the impact of trade openness, among other variables, in 
SO2 concentration. Their finding is a negative and significant impact. Antweiler et al. 
(2001) use the same polluter, but consider the effect of trade due to factor endowment 
abundance, in addition to the trade openness variable. They find similar results as 
Harbaugh et al. (2000) for trade openness. 
 
Frankel and Rose (2005) assess the impact of trade on the environment, taking as a 
dependent variable different environmental measures, among them CO2 emissions. This 
measure was the only one to result in a positive and significant coefficient of trade 
openness. The authors conclude that this could be a consequence of the pure global 
externality of CO2 emissions, leading to a free-rider problem. Countries do not attempt 
to reduce their emissions for fear of loss in competitiveness.   
 
These recent papers obtained different results for the impact of trade openness on the 
environment. Considering the paper from Frankel and Rose (2005) who estimated their 
model for seven different measures of environmental degradation, these results are not 
necessarily conflicting with one another. It is possible that trade has a different effect on 
CO2 emissions than on other environmental variables, as the authors suggest. 
 
3 Data and empirical model 
3a Mergers and Acquisitions 
Data for M&As comes from Thomson Financial Investment Bank. To collect the data, 
we considered every deal with status completed, as only M&As that have actually taken 
place can potentially have an impact on the environment. For the same reason, we 
considered the “effective date” of transaction instead of the “announced date”.  
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The collection of the data for this criteria resulted in 90,081 M&As for the period 1988 
until 2004. From this, 49,516 (55% of the total) did not have the value of the deal. Table 
3 below shows the division of the data with the four sectors considered in this study, 
and the corresponding number of deals with missing value. Three things stand out from 
this table. First, the majority of the M&As observed in this period were in the sector 
“Construction and Services”, corresponding to more than half of all transactions. 
Second, the sector that we would be more concerned with, “Pollution Intensive” is the 
second most important target of M&As, representing 32.2% of the deals in the period. 
Finally, regarding the problem of missing values, although this frequency is high, there 
is not much difference with respect to the sectors. The sector with the least missing 
values of the deal is “Agriculture and Mining” (41.6%) and the one with the most 
missing values is “Pollution Intensive” (57.4%).  
 
Table 3 – Number of M&As disaggregated by sector; 1988-2004 
Sector Total deals Observations without value 
 Frequency % of total 
frequency 
Frequency % of total 
sector 
Agriculture and Mining 5,164 5.7 2,146 41.6 
Construction and Service 48,671 54.0 26,872 55.2 
Pollution intensive 29,005 32.2 16,635 57.4 
Zero pollution intensive 7,241 8.0 3,863 53.3 
Total 90,081 100 49,516 55.0 
 
Table 3 shows the sectoral distribution of M&As in terms of number of M&As. 
Nevertheless, for our purpose, the value of the transactions is a better indication of the 
“size” of this investment for the target country, and will be our primary control variable 
for M&As. Therefore, in table 4 we show summary statistics for the value of the deal, 
disaggregated by sectors. Again, “Construction and Services” received the majority of 
M&As (58%), followed by “Pollution intensive” (30%). Additionally, also in terms of 
values, sector “Pollution intensive” embodies a significant part of all M&As. 
Comparing the percentage from total, in terms of number (third column from Table 3) 
and values (last column from Table 4), we find that, for all sectors, there is no 
substantial difference. 
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Table 4 – Value of M&As: summary statistics 
 Value of M&As (constant 2005 US dollars, millions) 
Sector Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum 
value 
Sum % of total 
value 
Agriculture and Mining 159 1,174 56,444 480,062 6.7 
Construction and Service 189 1,862 229,216 4,130,581 58.0 
Pollution intensive 173 913 47,414 2,136,794 30.0 
Zero pollution intensive 112 519 12,399 379,589 5.3 
Total 176 1,498 229,216 7,127,026 100 
 
Another noteworthy disaggregation is in terms of the development status from both 
acquirer and target countries. Considering the value of the deals
6
, table 5 shows that 
87% of all M&As are from developed countries, who take-over another firm from a 
developed country. The predominance of M&As from developed to developed countries 
occurs for all sectors analyzed. Nonetheless, Construction and Services is the main 
sector responsible for this, alone it corresponds to 50% of all M&As. 
 
Table 5 – Percentage of value of M&As disaggregated by sector and by development 
status of both acquirer and target countries; 1988 - 2004 
Target sector/ 
 Income classification 
Percentage of total value of M&As 
Acquiring country High Low or Middle  
Target country High Low or 
Middle 
High Low or 
Middle 
Total 
Agriculture and Mining 4.7 1.2 0.2 0.6 6.7 
Construction and Service 50.1 5.6 0.8 1.4 58.0 
Pollution intensive 26.7 2.0 0.8 0.6 30.0 
Zero pollution intensive 5.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 5.3 
Total 86.5 9.0 1.8 2.6 100 
 
Considering the sector “Pollution intensive”, M&As from developed to developed 
countries represent 26.7% of all M&As, from developed to developing countries this 
number is 2%. When the acquiring country is a developing country, then if the target is 
a developed country, the value of M&As in “Pollution intensive” sectors represents 
0.8% of all M&As, and 0.6% if the target is another developing country. Thus, these 
figures show that M&As in manufacturing sectors that pollute, represent a significant 
fraction of all M&As only when both target and acquiring countries are developed. 
                                                 
6
 Appendix C, Table C1, shows a similar (to Table 5) table considering the number of deals.  
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Additionally, this fraction is considerably smaller, when developing countries are one of 
the players. 
 
Finally, since our primary variable will be the value of M&As, it is important to check 
whether there are some data characteristics with more missing values then the others. 
We already showed that this was not the case for the target sectors of the deals. 
Additionally, we check the percentage of missing data for the 18 years considered in our 
analysis. Table C2 in Appendix C presents these results. It shows that the amount of 
missing data is more or less constant throughout the time. The average is 54.8%. The 
year with least missing data was 1988, with 49.4% of the M&As for that year not 
having the value of the deal. The year with most missing data was 1991, with 60% of 
missing values. 
 
The only concern we have by using the value of M&As, as our control variable of 
M&As, is that there are some important players, both as target and acquirers, that have a 
large amount of missing data for the value of transactions.
7
 On the other hand, the 
correlation between the value of the transaction (or number) and the percentage of 
missing data by country (both for target or acquirer) is very close to zero. In other 
words, it is not the case that more active countries in M&As have more complete data, 
nor the other way around. 
 
3b Additional control variables 
From the empirical literature, common control variables are: GDP, urban population, 
GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared. The inclusion of the first two variables is 
straightforward. The higher the GDP, the higher the demand for goods and services, and 
therefore more pollution is expected. In regard urbanization, many “dirty” activities 
(e.g. transport, production) take place in urban regions, causing higher emissions.  
 
The inclusion of a quadratic effect of GDP per capita on pollution is not so clear-cut. 
The motivation is the “Kuznets curve”, named after Simon Kuznets, who in a 1995 
paper showed that income inequality rises for lower economic development and 
                                                 
7
 In appendix C, we provide a more detailed descriptive analysis of the percentage of missing value by 
both target and acquirer countries. 
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decreases for higher economic development. Grossman and Krueger (1993) were the 
first to present similar evidence, but considering pollution in place of income inequality. 
The quadratic relationship between pollution and income per capita is now called the 
“Environmental Kuznets curve”. 
 
Figure 2 – Kuznets curve: GDP per capita and CO2 emissions 
  
  
Source: Data for Carbon Dioxide emissions and GDP per capita (constant 2000 dollars) are from the 
World Bank, WDI. 
 
If we were to consider the impact of GDP per capita alone on CO2 emissions, then 
indeed a quadratic relation would be a good approximation, as Figure 2 illustrates for 
four different groups of years. Nevertheless, this relation does not necessarily hold 
when other factors are taken into account. The empirical support for an Environmental 
Kuznets curve is mixed (see Stern, 2003 and Harbaugh et al., 2000 for a discussion on 
this issue and Frankel and Rose, 2005 for empirical findings of no environmental 
Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions). 
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Additionally, we take into consideration that the impact of growth on the environment 
can be separated in three channels: scale, technique and composition effect (see 
Copeland and Taylor, 2003). The scale effect represents the impact on the environment 
due to greater economic activity. We take the GDP as a measure for this effect. The 
composition effect refers to changes in the mix of economic activity, for example, 
specialization in cleaner or dirtier goods. The capital to labor ratio is a usual proxy for 
the composition effect, and it is taken to reflect the production of dirty and clean goods, 
respectively. The problem with this measure is data availability. Therefore, we consider 
instead the value added of manufacturing as a percentage of the GDP. Finally, the 
technique effect concerns the use of a cleaner or dirtier technology. It is common in the 
literature to take GDP per capita as a proxy for this. We propose the inclusion of a more 
direct measure of this effect, which is the percentage of electricity production from 
“dirty” sources. 
 
The 2000 Report from the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (both located in Washington D.C.), shows that Coal and Petroleum have the 
highest Carbon Dioxide Emissions per kWh of electricity generation compared to other 
sources of electricity generation in the United States, for the years 1998 and 1999. 
Marland and Boden (2001) present more general statistics, which points out to the 
higher CO2 emission rate of Coal and Petroleum Combustion. The reason for this is the 
ratio of Hydrogen to Carbon, which differs in each fuel. Taking, therefore, oil and coal 
as the fuels that most emit CO2 per unit of energy; we used World Bank‟s data on 
electricity production from different sources as a percentage from the total, and added 
the percentage originating from Coal and Petroleum. This is what we called “dirty” 
electricity, which is a measure of the technique effect.  
 
Other control variables we consider are: the share of manufacturing exports, the share of 
manufacturing imports, trade openness and an multilateral institutional variable. The 
definition, sources and availability of the variables are provided in Appendix D. Finally, 
the variables GDP, trade openness, GDP per capita and M&As
8
 are taken in their 
logarithmic form to correct for excessive skewness. In Appendix E we present the 
                                                 
8
 Since there are many zero values of M&As, to take the log of this variable we added 100 thousand 
dollars to all data. 
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skewness measure of all relevant control variables and CO2 emissions. When there was 
a gain in terms of reduction of skewness we considered the logarithmic form. 
3c Empirical model 
To test our hypotheses, we consider a Panel Data model, as described below: 
 
ititiit XCO  
'
,2 ,             (1) 
 
where i is an index for country and t for time. αi is a variable that captures unobserved 
heterogeneity for country i, and εit is an error term. 
 
Our dependent variable is Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions (in log). We chose this 
variable for three main reasons. First, the data coverage of CO2 emissions is available 
on an annual base from the World Bank for many countries, whereas other important air 
polluters, such as SO2 and NOx have much more limited coverage. Second, some 
authors (see Hoffman et al., 2005, for an example) argue that Carbon Dioxide is a good 
proxy to measure pollution levels. Third, CO2 is the major anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas causing global warming. It has, therefore, a global effect such as a rise in global 
temperatures. Other air pollutants (see Box 1) have a more local effect, such as acid rain 
and bad air quality. This distinction implies that their determinants could differ.  
 
Box 1 Local air pollutants 
 
Air pollutants emitted by local sources can bring local problems related to health and 
the environment. Common air polluters causing local problems are: Ozone (O3),  
Particulate matter (PM), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Sulfur 
Dioxide (SO2), and Lead (Pb) 
  
Below we separate health from environmental effects by listing the common air 
pollutants responsible for them. Additionally, we give a few examples of the specific 
problems caused by each of the air pollutants. 
 
Health effects  
- Ozone: can cause respiratory related problems. 
- Particulate matter: fine particles can get deep into the lungs and cause serious health 
problems. 
- Carbon Monoxide: can cause cardiovascular and central nervous system problems by 
reducing oxygen delivery to the body‟s organs and tissues. Additionally CO contributes 
to the formation of smog which may cause respiratory problems. 
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- Nitrogen Oxides: can cause damage to lung tissue and reduction in lung function. 
- Sulfur Dioxide: sensitive groups such as people with asthma who are active outdoors, 
children, the elderly and people with heart or lung disease may suffer from respiratory 
illness and aggravate existing heart disease when the air contains high levels of SO2. 
- Lead: can have neurological effects in children and cardiovascular effects in adults. 
 
Environmental effects  
- Ozone: can have detrimental effects on plants (e.g. interfering with the ability of 
sensitive plants to produce and store food) and ecosystems (reduction in forest growth 
and crop yields) 
- Particulate matter: fine particles can cause visibility reduction and acid rain. 
- Nitrogen Oxides: can cause reduction in visibility and acid rain, fog, snow or dry 
particles. 
- Sulfur Dioxide: can cause reduction in visibility and acid rain, fog, snow or dry 
particles. 
- Lead: can lead to losses in biodiversity, decreased growth and reproductive rates in 
plants and animals, and neurological effects in vertebrates. 
Note: One member of the NOx, Nitrous Oxide (N2O) is also a greenhouse gas, so additionally to local effects it also 
has global effects. 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency. 2008: What are the six common air pollutants? 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/index.html. Washington DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
Given our hypotheses, we disaggregate our control variables (Xit) in four groups, as 
below: 
 
itititititiit IMMCCO  
'*'*''
,2 ,          (2) 
 
where Mit encompasses M&As from four sectors, separated by the development level of 
the acquirer country, leading to eight variables. M
*
it is the interaction of Mit and the 
development status of the target country (1 if target is a High income economy, and 0 
otherwise). Therefore, it also consists of eight variables. Iit is the multilateral 
institutional variable. The final group, represented by Cit, covers the remaining control 
variables. 
 
The eight variables that form Mit are individually represented by Mk,j,i,t, where k = 
{A,C,P,Z) is an index for the target sector of the M&A (see Table 1) and j = {DC,LDC} 
stands for the development level of the acquirer country, either developed (DC) or least 
developed (LDC). Using this notation, tiDCPM ,,, , for example, stands for cross-border 
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mergers and acquisitions in the Pollution Intensive sector from developed countries 
(acquiring country). 
Considering the interaction terms in a similar way, we can evaluate the impact of 
M&As from developed/developing countries to developed/developing countries. To 
make things more clear, consider, as an example, the estimation result for M&As in the 
Pollution Intensive sector from developed countries. This would result in a parameter 
DCP, and 
*
,DCP (interaction term): 
 
*
,
*'
,,,,
'
,,, DCPtiDCPDCPtiDCP MM                          (3) 
 
We should interpret the result as follows: 
DCP,  measures the impact of M&As in 
Pollution Intensive sector from developed countries to developing countries; and 
*
,, DCPDCP    measures the impact of M&As in the same sector from developed 
countries to developed countries. This approach enables us to test the asymmetry and 
the sector-specific impact hypotheses.  
 
The variables of trade openness and multilateral agreements are also interacted with the 
development level of the target country. For the first variable, we want to check the 
impact of trade on the environment due to the pollution-haven hypothesis. Given the 
effect of trade on CO2 emissions via the specialization in capital intensive goods 
(controlled by the variables percentage of exports and imports of manufactures), the 
trade openness variables measure the pollution-haven hypothesis. Therefore, we test 
whether trade openness has a positive effect on CO2 emissions when the target is least 
developed (lax environmental regulation) and negative when the target is developed 
(strict environmental regulation), as established in the pollution-haven models. 
 
The reason for interacting the multilateral agreements with the development level of the 
target country is that richer countries are more likely to demand environment-friendly 
policy. Hence, we want to check whether a global agreement is less important for 
developed than developing countries in helping to reduce CO2 emissions. 
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4 Results 
4a Main results 
Our first estimation results consider the four sectors presented before, but it turned out 
that only variables of Pollution Intensive sector were significant. Therefore, we 
proceeded in steps to remove the non-significant sectors. Appendix F presents these 
initial results. Model 1F considers all four sectors, 2F removes the sector Construction 
and Services, 3F removes additionally the Zero Pollution Intensive sector and 4F also 
removes sector Agriculture and Mining. These sectors did not present a significant 
result in all models we tested, therefore, apart from the results in Appendix F, we do not 
include them in the estimations we discuss here. Nonetheless, these findings confirm 
our Sector-specific impact hypothesis. Indeed, only M&As in manufacturing sectors 
with a positive intensity of pollution have an impact on CO2 emissions. 
 
Regarding the estimation procedure, we used a Hausman test to choose between a 
Random and a Fixed Effect Model. The traditional Hausman test produced a non-
positive definite differenced covariance matrix for all of the models tested. Hence, we 
considered instead the covariance matrix based on a common estimate of the 
disturbance matrix. This generated the sigmamore and sigmaless option. The former 
specifies that the covariance matrix uses the estimated disturbance variance from the 
random effect estimator; and the latter from the fixed effect estimator. For details on 
these options for the Hausman test, see the online help file of stata
9
, which additionally 
recommends the use of these options when comparing fixed-effects and random-effects 
models. 
 
Our first results, presented in Appendix F, also show that a quadratic form for GDP per 
capita is not statistically significant. Hence, although we tested both specifications, we 
present in the next tables GDP per capita without the squared term, since only GDP per 
capita alone is statistically significant. 
 
In Table 6 we present our main findings. Model 1 includes only GDP per capita as a 
proxy for the technique effect, whereas model 2 also considers dirty electricity. Model 3 
                                                 
9
 http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?hausman 
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considers both these variables, and it replaces GDP by total population as a measure for 
the scale effect. Overall we find that the scale and the composition effect are important 
in explaining CO2 emissions. 
 
Table 6 – Fixed effect model for Carbon Dioxide Emissions; Endogenous variable is 
ln(CO2); Value of M&As is ln(MP,j,i,t+0.1), with j = {DC,LDC}. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 coefficient coefficient coefficient 
Institution -0.012  -0.016 ** -0.016 ** 
Institution*DDC 0.009  0.018  0.018  
Ln(MP,DC) 0.003  0.004 * 0.004 * 
Ln(MP,LDC) 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.006 ** 
Ln(MP,DC)*DDC -0.010 ** -0.012 ** -0.012 ** 
Ln(MP,LDC)*DDC -0.007 ** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** 
Ln(GDP) 1.519 *** 1.625 ***   
Ln(population)     1.625 *** 
Urban population (% total) 0.010  0.006  0.006  
Manufacturing (% GDP) 0.013 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 
Manufactures X (% exports) -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
Manufactures M (% imports) -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  
Ln(trade openness) 0.076  0.092 * 0.092 * 
Ln(trade openness)*DDC -0.027  -0.040 ** -0.040 ** 
Ln(GDPpc) -0.915 *** -0.963 *** 0.662 *** 
Dirty electricity   0.005 *** 0.005 *** 
Intercept -13.248 *** -15.460 *** -15.460 *** 
# of observations 1,555  1,357  1,357  
# of groups 136  113  113  
Within R-square 0.604  0.634  0.634  
F-statistics 26.81 *** 38.38 *** 38.38 *** 
Hausman test n.p.d.  n.p.d.  n.p.d.  
Hausman test, sigmamore 81.52 *** 68.47 *** 68.47 *** 
Hausman test, sigmaless 85.29 *** 71.34 *** 71.34 *** 
Notes: The dependent variable is Carbon Dioxide Emissions. Manufactures X = exports of manufactures. 
Manufactures M = imports of manufactures. DDC = dummy for development level of the target country; it 
takes the value of 1 if the target country is a Developed country and 0 otherwise. GDPpc = GDP per 
capita. n.p.d = not positive definite. To obtain the significance levels we considered robust estimates of 
the standard errors, to take into account possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the error 
terms.  
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The technique effect is also statistically significant. Model 1 and 2 show that higher 
GDP per capita of a country results in less CO2 emissions. Our preferred model between 
these two is number 2, since it has a higher explanatory power than model 1 and the 
inclusion of the variable dirty electricity was statistically significant. Our finding 
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indicates that a unit increase in the percentage of electricity coming from dirty sources 
increases CO2 emissions by 0.5%. 
 
Model 3 replaces GDP by Total Population as the scale variable. Therefore, Models 2 
and 3 are essentially similar. Nevertheless, we consider Model 3 to show the importance 
of the choice of the scale variable. Using GDP as the scale variable (Model 2) implies a 
negative coefficient for GDP per capita, whereas the opposite is true if we choose Total 
Population (Model 3). Although this seems trivial from an econometric perspective, its 
implication is fundamental. Authors that consider Total Population as the scale effect 
(e.g. Jorgenson, 2007) conclude that economic development (as measured by GDP per 
capita) is bad for the environment. Considering GDP the conclusion is reversed. 
 
A significant part of pollution has its origin in the production side of the economy. 
Therefore, the scale variable should not restrict to a measure of the demand side, such as 
Total Population. For this reason, we consider GDP as a better measure of the scale 
effect. Comparing Model 2 and 3, we prefer again number 2. Hence, we restrict the 
discussion of the results below to this Model.  
 
We do not find evidence for the factor endowment hypothesis. Both exports of 
manufacturing as imports of manufacturing were not statistically significant. Trade 
openness instead was significant. The more open a developing country is the higher its 
CO2 emissions. This is also the case for developed countries, but it is not as strong, as 
we can see by adding the coefficient of the interaction term. 
 
For the three hypotheses from Section 1, our findings were as follow: 
 
Empirical support for Multilateralism: 
Multilateral agreements are an important instrument in reducing CO2 emissions in both 
developed and developing countries. 
The results for the institution variable shows that we have support for the 
Multilateralism hypothesis. The increase in participation in multilateral agreements 
leads to a reduction in CO2 emissions. Each additional multilateral agreement that a 
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country participates in decreases CO2 emissions by 1.6%. Moreover, there is no 
significant difference between developed and developing countries.  
 
Empirical finding for the Asymmetry hypothesis: 
We did not find support for the Asymmetry hypothesis as stated in Section 1. Instead, 
we found another Asymmetry, with respect to the target sector of the M&As.  Using the 
notation from section 3c, our Asymmetry findings can be grouped in two: 
 
Pollution increases if target is from a least developed country 
Our findings show that M&As to least developed countries increases CO2 emissions in 
those countries. A 1% increase in M&As from Developed Countries to Least Developed 
Countries in sector Positive-Intensity-Pollution implies an increase of 0.004% in CO2 
emissions. When the acquiring country is instead a Least Developing Country, the 
impact is stronger, of 0.006%. 
 
Therefore, regardless of the acquiring country development status, firms that merge or 
acquire a firm from a least developed country contribute to CO2 emissions in those 
countries. This finding suggests that acquiring firms tend to take advantage of the laxer 
environmental regulation of least developed countries. This could occur by adopting 
dirtier technologies, sending old technologies from the acquiring firm to the target firm, 
or by using the full capacity of production of the firm.  
 
Pollution decreases if target is from a developed country 
Our findings show that M&As to developed countries decreases CO2 emissions in those 
countries. A 1% increase in M&As from Developed Countries to Developed Countries 
in sector Positive-Intensity-Pollution implies a decrease of 0.008% in CO2 emissions. 
When the acquiring country is instead a Least Developing Country, the impact is 
weaker, of 0.001%. 
 
Again, the results have the same direction for both developed and least developed 
acquiring country. These results suggest that firms that merge or acquire a firm from a 
developed country have to adjust to their stricter environmental regulation. By doing 
 24 
that the multinational firm contributes to the decrease in CO2 emissions in the target 
country. Nonetheless, we notice that this effect is stronger when the acquiring country is 
also from a developed country. 
 
The empirical results for the Asymmetry hypothesis show that only part of our 
argument from section 2 holds. There we wrote about our expectations of a decrease in 
CO2 emissions with M&As from developed countries. Nonetheless, this only takes 
place when the target country is a developed country. In other words, the destination 
country of the M&As is what matters, and not the origin. This makes sense once we 
take into account that most M&As do not result in new production plants, but they use 
instead the facilities of the target firm. Therefore, the “innovation offset” has to be 
substantial in order to motivate the firms to adopt cleaner technologies. When this 
innovation offset is not present, as in least developed countries, the acquiring firm 
actually takes advantage of the laxer regulation and pollutes more. 
 
Hence, the Asymmetry hypothesis from Section 1 should be re-written as: 
Hypothesis 1A: Target Country Asymmetry 
(i) M&As to a high income country (target country) reduce CO2 emissions. 
(ii) M&As to a low or middle income country (target country) increase CO2 
emissions. 
 
Support for the Sector-Specific hypothesis: 
Only M&As on Pollution Intensive sectors affect pollution levels 
As we pointed out in the beginning of this Section, our findings show that only M&As 
in manufacturing sectors with a strictly positive intensity of pollution have an effect on 
the pollution levels of the target country. Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Service 
and Manufacturing Sectors with an intensity of pollution equal to zero, have no effect. 
These sectors represent approximately 70% of all M&As observed between 1988-2004 
(see Table 5).  
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4b Robustness check 
Five sector disaggregation 
In the main results the disaggregation of manufacturing sectors considered as polluting 
any manufacturing sector with a positive intensity of pollution, even if this index was 
very low. As a robustness check we test for a possible difference between polluting 
sectors with respect to the impact on CO2 emissions. For that, we disaggregate 
manufacturing sectors in three sectors according to their pollution intensity. Table 7 
describes this disaggregation (see Appendix A for details). 
 
Table 7 – Sector disaggregation; 5 sectors 
Sector Group Representative sectors  
A – Agriculture and Mining Agriculture; Forestry; Fishing and Mining 
C – Construction and Services Construction; Transportation; Communications; 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services, Wholesale 
Trade; Retail Trade; Finance; Insurance; Real 
Estate; Services; Public Administration 
H – High Pollution Intensive Petroleum refining and related industries; Primary 
Metal Industries 
M – Medium Pollution Intensive Food and kindred products; Textile mill products; 
Furniture and fixtures; Stone, clay and concrete 
products; Fabricated metal products 
Z – Zero Pollution Intensive Apparel and other finished products made from 
fabrics and similar materials; Leather and leather 
products 
Note: Representative sectors in groups P, M and Z are based on 2 digit code classification. They are listed as 
representative because many of the 4 digit SIC code under them belong to one of these groups. For the exact 
disaggregation, see Appendix A. 
 
Table 8 presents the results using this five sector disaggregation. Once again, we only 
report the results of manufacturing sectors Medium Pollution Intensive and High 
Pollution Intensive, since coefficients for the other sectors were not statistically 
significant. The only difference between the results from Model 4 (Table 8) and Model 
2 (Table 6) is the disaggregation of the Pollution Intensive sector in Medium and High 
Pollution Intensive sectors. Overall, this disaggregation confirmed our findings from 
Model 2. 
 
Regarding the Multilateralism hypothesis, there is no reason for the results to change 
with a further disaggregation of the data. Indeed, the hypothesis is supported by these 
robustness results. 
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Table 8 – Fixed effect model for Carbon Dioxide Emissions; Endogenous variable is 
ln(CO2); Value of M&As is ln(Mk,j,i,t+0.1), with k = {H,M} and j = {DC,LDC}. 
(4) 
 coefficient  coefficient  
Institution -0.016 ** Ln(GDP) 1.627 *** 
Institution*DI 0.018  Urban population (% total) 0.006  
Ln(MH,DC) 0.001  Manufacturing (% GDP) 0.012 *** 
Ln(MM,DC) 0.004 * Manufactures X (% exports) -0.001  
Ln(MH,LDC) 0.005 ** Manufactures M (% imports) -0.001  
Ln(MM,LDC) 0.004 * Ln(trade openness) 0.096 * 
Ln(MH,DC)*DI -0.005 * Ln(trade openness)*DI -0.056 ** 
Ln(MM,DC)*DI -0.009 ** Ln(GDPpc) -0.967 *** 
Ln(MH,LDC)*DI -0.006 ** Dirty electricity 0.005 *** 
Ln(MM,LDC)*DI -0.006 * Intercept -15.467 *** 
# of observations 1,357     
# of groups 113     
Within R-square 0.64     
F-statistics 35.44 ***    
Hausman test n.p.d.     
Hausman test, sigmamore 82.45 ***    
Hausman test, sigmaless 86.62 ***    
Notes: The dependent variable is Carbon Dioxide Emissions. Manufactures X = exports of manufactures. 
Manufactures M = imports of manufactures. DI = dummy for development level of the target country; it 
takes the value of 1 if the target country is a Developed country and 0 otherwise. GDPpc = GDP per 
capita. n.p.d = not positive definite. To obtain the significance levels we considered robust estimates of 
the standard errors, to take into account possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the error 
terms.  
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The Sector-specific impact hypothesis is also supported by the results. Now we have 
further support that sectors with a positive intensity of pollution are the only relevant 
sectors in analyzing the impact of M&As on CO2 emissions. This is the case for 
Medium and High Pollution Intensive, showing that further disaggregation of the data 
does not add much to the analysis. 
 
Finally, we find support for the Target Country Asymmetry Hypothesis. For both 
Medium and High Pollution Intensive sectors, we find that: (i) M&As to low or middle 
income countries increases CO2 emissions in those countries, regardless of the acquiring 
country; (ii) M&As to high income countries decreases CO2 emissions in those 
countries, regardless of the acquiring country. 
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5 Conclusion 
This paper looks into the impact of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and 
Multilateral Agreements in Carbon Dioxide emissions. Using data from 1988 until 2004 
for more than 100 target countries, we make three contributions to the empirical 
literature on the driving forces of pollution emissions. First, we show that only M&As 
in manufacturing sectors with a positive intensity of pollution have an impact on CO2 
emissions. Second, we find that there is an Asymmetry with respect to the target 
country development level. Third, we propose an Institutional variable for Multilateral 
Agreement, and show that Multilateral Agreements are important to reduce pollution. 
 
The three findings have an important policy implication. Our institutional variable 
measures the participation of countries in ten major environmental multilateral 
agreements. We found that the participation of countries in those agreements has a 
significant impact on CO2 emissions reduction. Therefore, the increase in the number of 
participating members in these agreements, particularly countries with a high emission 
of Carbon Dioxide, should be part of the solution to revert the increasing trend of CO2 
emissions. 
 
Our empirical results indicate that if the United States, for example, would have 
participated on 5 instead of 4 agreements in 2004, it would have led to a decrease in 
CO2 emissions by 9.6*10
7
 metric tons. This amount is approximately the same as the 
total emissions of Greece or Vietnam in 2004. In this same year the United States alone 
emitted 6.0*10
9
 metric tons of carbon dioxide, approximately 22% of the world‟s 
emission. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment is a driving force analyzed in the empirical literature on the 
determinants of pollution emissions. Considering M&As, which is the main part of FDI, 
we showed that only a few sectors are relevant in the analysis. Sectors such as 
Agriculture, Mining, Construction and Services should be excluded from empirical 
papers on CO2 emissions. In addition, not every manufacturing sector affects pollution 
if M&As occur, as M&As in sectors with a zero intensity of pollution do not have an 
impact on CO2 emissions. In terms of policy implication, this result suggests a focus on 
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policy. Local authorities concerned with the environmental impact of M&As could 
impose conditions to acquiring firms in critical sectors, that is, manufacturing sectors 
with a positive intensity of pollution. 
 
In particular, our findings suggest that least developed countries should be the ones 
more concerned by the increase in pollution that M&As could bring to their countries. 
Acquiring firms, from both developed and developing countries, take advantage of the 
laxer environmental regulation in those countries, and pollute more. We found robust 
evidence of an Asymmetry with respect to the Target countries. Table 9 summarizes 
these results. 
 
Table 9 – Impact on pollution of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 Non-polluting sectors Pollution Intensive sector 
Income classification Acquirer Acquirer 
Target High Low or Middle High Low or Middle 
High 0 0 - - - 
Low or Middle 0 0 + + + 
 
Firms active in M&As are more likely to innovate and adopt cleaner technologies. In 
spite of that, the results summarized in Table 9 show that if a target country has a lax 
environmental regulation, as in least developed countries, the outcome of M&As (in 
polluting sectors) will be an increase in pollution. On the other hand, developed 
countries, with their stricter environmental regulation offer an innovation offset for 
firms to become cleaner. Acquiring firms, regardless of the development level of their 
country will contribute to a decrease in the pollution if the target is from a developed 
country. This finding suggests that not only multilateral agreements are important, but 
local regulation and enforcement are the ultimate objective of these agreements. 
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Appendix A: Sector disaggregation 
Sector Agriculture and Mining: 
SIC 01, 02, 07, 08, 09 (Agriculture, forestry and fisheries); SIC 10, 12, 13, 14 (Mineral 
industries). 
 
Sector Construction and Services: 
SIC 15, 16, 17 (Construction industries); SIC 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49) 
(Transportation, communication and utilities); SIC 50, 51 (Wholesale trade); SIC 52, 
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 (Retail trade); SIC 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67 (Finance, 
insurance and real state); SIC 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 
89 (Service industries); SIC 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99 (Public administration). 
 
Sector Pollution Intensive and Zero Pollution Intensive: 
SIC 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 
(manufacturing). 
 
Giving the degree of pollution intensity of the subsectors (on a four digit SIC code 
classification), we separate the sectors with a positive intensity of pollution from the 
ones with a zero intensity of pollution. To classify the sectors on their pollution 
intensity we based on data from the Industrial Pollution Projection System (IPPS) 
elaborated by Hettige et al. (1995)
10
. We ordered the sectors based on their Carbon 
Monoxide (CO) pollution intensity. Sectors with a pollution intensity equal to zero were 
included in the group Zero Pollution Intensive, and with positive pollution intensity in 
the group Pollution Intensive. 
 
With this criteria we obtained the following division based on a four digit SIC code 
classification: 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 The measure of emission is divided by the total output of the firm, leading to the sectoral “emission 
intensities”, as we use here. For more detail on the estimation of these emission intensities, see Hettige et 
al. (1995). 
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Sector Zero Pollution Intensive: 
 SIC 2021, 2045, 2053, 2068, 2097, 2098, 2241, 2252, 2254, 2273, 2311, 2323, 2325, 
2326, 2329, 2331, 2335, 2337, 2342, 2353, 2361, 2369, 2371, 2381, 2384, 2385, 2386, 
2387, 2389, 2391, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2397, 2399, 2411,, 2448, 2449, 2451, 2452, 2514, 
2591, 2656, 2657, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2741, 2761, 2796, 2835, 2836, 
3052, 3061, 3082, 3083, 3084, 3085, 3086, 3087, 3088, 3131, 3142, 3143, 3144, 3149, 
3151, 3171, 3172, 3199, 3262, 3263, 3363, 3364 3365, 3366, 3412, 3425, 3442, 3448, 
3451, 3466, 3491, 3492, 3498, 3533, 3534, 3536, 3537, 3543, 3545, 3546, 3547, 3548, 
3549, 3552, 3553, 3556, 3565, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3581, 3586, 3593, 3594, 
3596, 3613, 3625, 3635, 3644, 3645, 3646, 3652, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3676, 3677, 3678, 
3695, 3716, 3799, 3812, 3821, 3824, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3843, 3844, 3845, 3873, 
3915, 3942, 3944, 3953, 3955, 3961, 3965. 
 
Sector Pollution Intensive: 
Medium Pollution Intensive 
SIC 2011, 2013, 2015, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2026, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2037, 2038, 
2041, 2043, 2044, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2051, 2052, 2062, 2064, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 
2079, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2091, 2092, 2095, 2096, 2099, 2131, 2141, 
2221, 2231, 2251, 2253, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2261, 2262, 2269, 2281, 2282, 2284, 2295, 
2297, 2298, 2299, 2322, 2339, 2341, 2392, 2396, 2431, 2434, 2439, 2441, 2491, 2493, 
2511, 2512, 2515, 2517, 2519, 2521, 2522, 2531, 2541, 2542, 2599, 2652, 2653, 2655, 
2671, 2672, 2679, 2711, 2721, 2731, 2732, 2752, 2754, 2759, 2771, 2782, 2789, 2791, 
2813, 2819, 2821, 2833, 2834, 2841, 2842, 2843, 2844, 2851, 2874, 2875, 2879, 2891, 
2893, 2952, 2992, 3011, 3021, 3053, 3069, 3081, 3089, 3111, 3161, 3211, 3229, 3231, 
3253, 3255, 3259, 3261, 3264, 3269, 3271, 3272, 3273, 3275, 3281, 3291, 3292, 3295, 
3297, 3299, 3316, 3317, 3351, 3353, 3354, 3355, 3356, 3357, 3398, 3399, 3411, 3421, 
3423, 3429, 3431, 3432, 3433, 3441, 3443, 3444, 3446, 3449, 3452, 3462, 3463, 3465, 
3469, 3471, 3479, 3483, 3484, 3489, 3494, 3495, 3496, 3497, 3499, 3511, 3519, 3523, 
3524, 3531, 3532, 3535, 3541, 3542, 3544, 3554, 3555, 3561, 3562, 3563, 3564, 3566, 
3567, 3568, 3569, 3579, 3582, 3585, 3589, 3599, 3612, 3621, 3629, 3631, 3632, 3633, 
3634, 3639, 3641, 3643, 3647, 3648, 3651, 3661, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3679, 3691, 3692, 
3694, 3699, 3711, 3713, 3714, 3715, 3721, 3724, 3728, 3731, 3732, 3743, 3751, 3761, 
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3764, 3769, 3792, 3822, 3823, 3825, 3842, 3851, 3861, 3911, 3914, 3931, 3949, 3951, 
3952, 3991, 3993, 3995, 3999. 
High Pollution Intensive 
SIC 2061, 2063, 2211, 2421, 2426, 2429, 2435, 2436, 2499, 2611, 2621, 2631, 2812, 
2816, 2824, 2861, 2865, 2869, 2873, 2892, 2899, 2911, 2951, 2999, 3221, 3241, 3251, 
3274, 3296, 3312, 3313, 3315, 3321, 3322, 3324,  3325, 3334, 3339, 3341, 3369, 3493, 
3559, 3592, 3624, 3795.  
 
Above, under the Pollution Intensive sector we additionally present the classification 
used for our robustness check. Using the ordered sectors based on their Carbon 
Monoxide (CO) pollution intensity, sectors with a pollution intensity over the 90 
percentile were classified as High Pollution Intensive. Sectors with zero intensity of 
pollution were again classified as Zero Pollution Intensive. The remaining sectors were 
classified as Medium Pollution Intensive. 
 
Furthermore, we used this classification for all target countries. For that we assumed 
that the same sectors are high/medium/zero pollution intensive in the United States 
(source of data from the IPPS) and all other countries. This assumption is common in 
the literature (e.g. Eskeland and Harrison, 1997), and it rests on the fact that 
proportionally the pollution intensity among the sectors within a country is the same. 
Therefore, it still allows countries to be more or less environmental friendly. Although 
in practice these indices would differ per country, it is quite acceptable that some 
sectors are the most polluting sectors everywhere (such as petroleum refining and 
primary metal industries). Similarly for Zero Pollution Intensive, we expect that textile 
manufacturing, for example, will have one of the lowest intensity of pollution in every 
country. 
 
Appendix B: Construction of variable “institution” 
We created a variable that captures the institutional level of 155 countries of the world 
with respect to the environment. We considered data from the Earth Trends, World 
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Resources Institute
11
, which provides data on the year of ratification of 10 major 
multilateral agreements. With this information, we constructed a new dataset with the 
number of agreements ratified by each country from 1988 until 2005. This gave us an 
index from 0 (no agreements ratified) until 10 (all major agreements ratified) for each 
country between 1988-2005. The advantage of this dataset is twofold. First, it comprises 
a wide range of countries and years. Second, we include in one index, the participation 
or not in 10 major multilateral agreements. This dataset is available upon request. 
 
Appendix C: Additional data description 
Table C1 – Percentage of number of M&As by development status of target and 
acquirer countries; 1988 - 2004 
Target sector/ 
 Income classification 
Percentage of total number of M&As  
Acquiring country High Low or Middle  
Target country High Low or 
Middle 
High Low or 
Middle 
Total 
Agriculture and Mining 3.4 1.7         0.2 0.5 5.7 
Construction and Service 42.5 7.6 1.5 2.5 54.0 
Positive-intensity-pollution 24.5 5.5  0.7 1.5 32.2 
Zero-intensity-pollution 7.0 0.7              0.1 0.2 8.0 
Total 77.3 15.5  2.6 4.6 100 
 
Table C2 – Data per year: missing value of the deal 
Year Number of 
M&As 
Number of deals 
without the value 
% from 
year 
1988 1,758 869 49.4 
1989 2,724 1,391 51.1 
1990 3,062 1,541 50.3 
1991 3,530 2,117 60.0 
1992 3,260 1,901 58.3 
1993 3,477 2,004 57.6 
1994 4,361 2,507 57.5 
1995 5,277 3,127 59.3 
1996 5,653 3,155 55.8 
1997 6,276 3,355 53.5 
1998 7,334 3,982 54.3 
1999 8,501 4,733 55.7 
                                                 
11
 World Resources Institute. 2005 EarthTrends: Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Available at 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/data_tables/gov3_2005.pdf. Washington DC: World Resources 
Institute. 
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2000 9,828 5,492 55.9 
2001 7,486 4,102 54.8 
2002 5,548 2,922 52.7 
2003 5,591 2,976 53.2 
2004 6,415 3,342 52.1 
 
C1  Missing values by target and acquirer countries 
In the main text we showed that the existence of the value of M&As is random in regard 
sectors and years of the deals. Nonetheless, one potential concern is that some countries 
appear to have more missing data than other. Figure C1 below plots the percentage of 
missing value for each country, when in the position of target, and Figure C2 similarly 
when they are in the position of acquirers. Both graphs show on the horizontal axis the 
value of the deals, in log. A few countries call attention for their high percentage of 
missing values, among them, Austria (82% when target; 78% when acquirer) and 
Germany (75% when target; 77% when acquirer). 
 
Figure C1 – Missing value, by target country 
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Figure C2 – Missing value, by acquirer country 
Percentage of M&As without value, by acquirer country
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One thing that immediately stands out when comparing the missing value for countries 
in the position of target and acquirer is that these values are very similar for every 
country. In other words, countries that have more missing value when in the position of 
acquirer also have more missing value when in the position of target. To check for the 
validity of this statement, we computed the correlation between the percentage of 
missing value for target and acquirer countries. Considering only countries which had 
more than 10 M&As (both as target and as acquirer) for the whole period, the 
correlation was of 0.57; and taking instead only countries which had more than 100 
M&As, the correlation was of striking 0.9. 
 
Table C3 – Missing value: countries are either in the position of targets or of acquirers 
 
Income 
classification 
Target Acquirer 
No. 
M&As 
No. missing 
values 
% missing 
values 
No. 
M&As 
No. missing 
values 
% missing 
values 
High 77,522 43,028 55.5 90,510 50,084 55.3 
Middle or Low  20,415 10,734 52.6 7,427 3,678 49.5 
Total 97,937 53,762 54.9 44,175 53,762 54.9 
 
Finally, grouping the countries by their income classification, developing countries 
(either as target or as acquirer) have relatively less missing data, although this difference 
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is not so substantial, especially when we compare them in the position of target. This is 
what Table C3 shows. 
 
Appendix D: Data sources 
Variable Definition Source Period 
CO2 Emissions (metric tons)  World Bank 1988-2004 
M&As flows  Thomson Financial 
Investment Banking 
1988-2004 
Population (total) Number of residents World Bank 1988-2004 
GDP Constant 2000 US$ World Bank 1988-2004 
Manufacturing Value added (% of GDP) World Bank 1988-2004 
Urban Urban population (% of total) World Bank 1988-2004 
Manufactures 
exports 
(% of merchandise exports) World Bank 1988-2004 
 
Manufactures 
imports 
(% of merchandise imports) World Bank 1988-2004 
GDP per capita Constant 2000 US$ World Bank 1988-2004 
Dirty electricity Electricity production from 
coal and oil sources (% of 
total) 
World Bank 1988-2004 
Institution Index of participation in major 
multilateral agreements (0 – 
10) 
World Resources 
Institute 
1988-2004 
 
Appendix E: Skewness 
Table E1 – Summary statistics (1988 – 2004) 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness; 
variable in 
natural units 
Skewness; 
variable in 
ln 
CO2 (metric tons) 1.2*10
8
 7.6*10
6
 4.93*10
8
 8.6 0.0 
Population 2.9*10
7
 5.3*10
6
 1.1*10
8
 8.7 -0.2 
GDP 1.6*10
11
 7.6*10
9
 7.5*10
11
 9.5 0.3 
Manufacturing 14.9 14.4 8.2 0.7 -1.1 
Urban 53.5 53.4 24.5 0.1 -0.9 
Manufactures exports 45.8 43.6 31.4 0.1 -2.3 
Manufactures imports 68.9 70.5 11.0 -0.7 -1.5 
Dirty electricity 38.9 32.6 33.5 0.5 -1.6 
GDPpc 5,772.0 1,708.1 8,482.8 2.0 0.1 
Trade openness 83.5 72.7 47.1 1.5 -0.7 
 
The decision of taking the independent and dependent variables in their natural or 
logarithmic form was based on their skewness measure. For that we analyzed basic 
statistics of the variables, as well as a visual comparison of the variables histograms 
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when using its natural and logarithmic form. Table E1 presents the descriptive statistics, 
and Figure E1 gives the histogram for the relevant variables. 
 
Figure E1 – Selected variables – histograms; Graphs on the left show variables in 
natural units; Graphs on the right show variables in logarithm. 
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Appendix F: Additional results 
Table F1 – Fixed effect model for Carbon Dioxide Emissions; Endogenous variable is 
ln(CO2); Value of M&As is ln(Mk,j,i,t+0.1), with k = {A,C,P,Z} and j = {DC,LDC}. 
 (1F) (2 F) (3 F) (4 F) 
 coefficient coefficient coefficient Coefficient 
Institution -0.013 * -0.012  -0.012  -0.012  
Institution*DDC 0.009  0.007  0.007  0.007  
Ln(MA,DC) -0.000  -0.000  0.000    
Ln(MC,DC) 0.001        
Ln(MP,DC) 0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003  
Ln(MZ,DC) -0.001  -0.001      
Ln(MA,LDC) 0.002  0.002  0.002    
Ln(MC,LDC) 0.001        
Ln(MP,LDC) 0.004 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 
Ln(MZ,LDC) 0.002  0.004      
Ln(MA,DC)*DDC 0.001  0.001  0.001    
Ln(MC,DC) *DDC -0.006        
Ln(MP,DC)*DDC -0.008  -0.010 ** -0.011 ** -0.011 ** 
Ln(MZ,DC) *DDC 0.000  -0.001      
Ln(MA,LDC)*DDC 0.001  0.000  0.000    
Ln(MC,LDC) *DDC -0.005        
Ln(MP,LDC)*DDC -0.006 ** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 ** 
Ln(MZ,LDC) *DDC -0.000  -0.004      
Ln(GDP) 1.539 *** 1.528 *** 1.527 *** 1.527 *** 
Urban population (%) 0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  
Manufacturing (% GDP) 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 
Manufactures X (% X) -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
Manufactures M (% M) -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  
Ln(trade openness) 0.080 * 0.077  0.076  0.077  
Ln(trade openness)*DDC -0.035  -0.033  -0.025  -0.027  
Ln(GDPpc) -1.124 * -1.089 * -1.082 * -1.079 * 
Ln(GDPpc)
2
 0.013  0.011  0.011  0.011  
Intercept -12.852 *** -12.743 *** -12.783 *** -12.812 *** 
# of observations 1,555  1,555  1,555  1,555  
# of groups 136  136  136  136  
Within R-square 0.605  0.604  0.604  0.604  
F-statistics 22.92 *** 24.28 *** 25.73 *** 29.12 *** 
Hausman test n.p.d.  n.p.d.  n.d.p.  n.p.d.  
Hausman test, sigmamore 104.36 *** 101.28 *** 93.84 *** 89.88 *** 
Hausman test, sigmaless 110.11 *** 106.83 *** 98.71 *** 94.52 *** 
Notes: The dependent variable is Carbon Dioxide Emissions. Manufactures X = exports of manufactures. 
Manufactures M = imports of manufactures. DDC = dummy for development level of the target country; it 
takes the value of 1 if the target country is a Developed country and 0 otherwise. GDPpc = GDP per 
capita. n.p.d = not positive definite. To obtain the significance levels we considered robust estimates of 
the standard errors, to take into account possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the error 
terms.  
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
